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Background. Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) has been associated with impairments in stop-signal inhibition,
a measure of motor response suppression. The study used a novel paradigm to examine both thought suppression
and response inhibition in OCD, where the modulatory eﬀects of stimuli relevant to OCD could also be assessed.
Additionally, the study compared inhibitory impairments in OCD patients with and without co-morbid depression,
as depression is the major co-morbidity of OCD.
Method. Volitional response suppression and unintentional thought suppression to emotive and neutral stimuli
were examined using a novel thought stop-signal task. The thought stop-signal task was administered to non-
depressed OCD patients, depressed OCD patients and healthy controls (n=20 per group).
Results. Motor inhibition impairments were evident in OCD patients, while motor response performance did not
diﬀer between patients and controls. Switching to a new response but not motor inhibition was aﬀected by stimulus
relevance in OCD patients. Additionally, unintentional thought suppression as measured by repetition priming was
intact. OCD patients with and without depression did not diﬀer on any task performance measures, though there
were signiﬁcant diﬀerences in all self-reported measures.
Conclusions. Results support motor inhibition deﬁcits in OCD that remain stable regardless of stimulus meaning or
co-morbid depression. Only switching to a new response was inﬂuenced by stimulus meaning. When response
inhibition was successful in OCD patients, so was the unintentional suppression of the accompanying thought.
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Introduction
Individuals with obsessive-compulsive disorder
(OCD) suﬀer from obsessions, which are recurrent
intrusive thoughts, and/or compulsions, which are
ritualistic repetitive behaviours or mental acts (APA,
1994). This debilitating condition has a lifetime preva-
lence of 2–3% (Robins et al. 1984). The clinical presen-
tation of OCD is heterogeneous, not only with large
variations between individuals in the nature of their
obsessions and compulsions as well as treatment re-
sponse, but also with changes in symptoms and their
severity over time within individuals (Miguel et al.
2005). Brain abnormalities have been noted in OCD
patients in the prefrontal cortex, including the orbito-
frontal cortex, parietal cortex and striatum (Menzies
et al. 2008). Notwithstanding the variability in clinical
presentation, consistent impairment in volitional sup-
pression of simple actions has led to the suggestion
that response inhibition deﬁcits may provide a useful
intermediate marker of brain dysfunction, or endo-
phenotype, for OCD (Chamberlain et al. 2005). Such
an endophenotype could facilitate greater clarity in
discerning the diagnostic classiﬁcation, aetiological
understanding, as well as the course, outcome and
treatment strategies for OCD.
Dysfunction of inhibitory control has long been
theorized to be a central feature of OCD. Impairments
in intentionally inhibiting simple motor actions have
been clearly demonstrated in OCD patients using the
stop signal task (Chamberlain et al. 2006a). In this task,
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ORIGINAL ARTICLEparticipants perform a speeded identiﬁcation go task
to simple stimuli (e.g. pressing right and left keys in
response to right and left pointing arrows, respec-
tively). On occasion a sudden auditory stop signal
follows the go stimuli signalling to inhibit the planned
pre-potent response (Logan & Cowan, 1984). Import-
antly, the deﬁcit is speciﬁc to inhibition in this task, as
OCD patients do not demonstrate additional impair-
ment in their go response. Consistent with the pro-
posal of impaired inhibition as an endophenotype for
OCD, is the ﬁnding of impaired inhibition of simple
motor responses in unaﬀected ﬁrst-degree relatives
of individuals with OCD (Chamberlain et al. 2007b).
Recent evidence has further suggested that there are
structural brain diﬀerences linked to inhibitory pro-
cessing using the stop signal task, distinguishing both
OCD patients and their unaﬀected ﬁrst-degree re-
latives from healthy controls (Menzies et al. 2007).
The present study examined whether an endo-
phenotype of impaired stopping could be extended to
inhibition of ongoing thoughts. To investigate whether
individualswithOCDterminatetheirongoingprocess-
ing eﬀectively when given a salient external switch
signal, we used a novel adaptation of the thought stop-
signal task (TSST) (Logan, 1985). Participants per-
formed speeded word judgements and, as in the
standard stop-signal task, were occasionally signalled
to stop. By examining performance on a subsequent
presentation, we investigated whether the thoughts
underlying the actions were also inhibited along with
the response. Speeding from the repeated pres-
entations was used to determine whether the orig-
inal thoughts went on to completion when the overt
responses were inhibited. The repetition eﬀect (rep-
etition priming) refers to the faster response found
when the same judgement is made again. Previous
studies have suggested that simple thoughts that go
on to completion lead to greater repetition priming
compared with inhibited thoughts (Logan, 1985).
While repetition priming has been linked to the left
inferior frontal gyrus (Wagner et al. 2000), response
inhibition has been linked to a network involving the
right inferior frontal gyrus (Aron et al. 2003). As the
instructions pertain to inhibiting the motor response
and not directly to suppression of the underlying
thought, performance should be sensitive to uninten-
tional suppression of thoughts accompanying an in-
tentional action. This is an important distinction, as
impairments in suppressing particular thoughts and
memories may underlie the recurrent nature of ob-
sessions.
The study further sought to address whether im-
paired inhibition would be found when inhibiting
meaningful stimuli, as the standard stop signal task
uses simple, non-emotive stimuli. An endophenotype
of response inhibition would suggest impairment
regardless of stimulus meaning. However, stimulus
meaning appears to play a role in OCD performance in
other forms of cognitive inhibition. For instance, in
directed forgetting studies, OCD patients have diﬃ-
culty suppressing and therefore forgetting certain
words when instructed to do so, though results have
been inconsistent as to whether this is exclusive to
personally relevant negative material, all negative
material, or personally relevant material regardless of
valence (Wilhelm et al. 1996; Tolin et al. 2002; Bohne
et al. 2005). Data from other paradigms using aﬀective
stimuli and believed to employ inhibitory processing
such as negative priming, aﬀective Stroop and thought
suppression tasks have yielded inconsistent results
(Hartston & Swerdlow, 1999; Moritz et al. 2004). Fur-
ther, the extent to which performance in these tasks
requires inhibition is controversial (e.g. Tipper, 2001).
Accordingly, the current study examined whether
stimulus meaning inﬂuences response-related proces-
sing, inhibition-related processing, or both in patients
with OCD.
Studies demonstrating response inhibition deﬁcits
in OCD using the stop-signal task have been careful to
exclude co-morbidities. However, such co-morbidities
are common (Pigott et al. 1994), with major depressive
disorder (MDD) being the main one (Sasson et al.
1997). In fact, little is known about the neuropsycho-
logical proﬁle of OCD with concurrent depression.
Some evidence suggests that OCD patients with co-
morbid depression may have larger inhibitory deﬁcits
than those without depression, as the former exhibit
additional brain abnormalities and diﬀerential meta-
bolic responses to selective serotonin reuptake in-
hibitors (SSRIs) (Saxena et al. 2002; Cardoner et al.
2007). Nevertheless, response inhibition in patients
with MDD and no OCD appears preserved (Murphy
et al. 1999; Lau et al. 2007), despite impairments in
executive function, memory and aﬀective processing
(Chamberlain & Sahakian, 2004). Moreover, MDD
in the context of OCD appears to diﬀer from non-
co-morbid depression in clinical features and treat-
ment response (Fineberg et al. 2005). Hence we
compared response inhibition in OCD patients with
versus without co-morbid depression. Increased im-
pairments to negative material would be expected,
particularly in the former group, as individuals with
MDD demonstrate increased sensitivity, slowed re-
sponding and enhanced memory for negative material
(Chamberlain & Sahakian, 2004; Leppanen, 2006).
In sum, we addressed the following questions using
the TSST paradigm. First, when a motor response to a
word is inhibited, is the accompanying thought sup-
pressed, and if so, is this moderated by OCD? Given
the important role of thought suppression in OCD
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evidence for abnormal unintentional thought sup-
pression would be found. Second, is motor response
inhibition in OCD inﬂuenced by the meaning of the
stimulus triggering the go response? Third, are go
responses inﬂuenced by stimulus meaning? OCD
patients may demonstrate diﬀerential processing of
OCD-relevant stimuli. Finally, do OCD patients with
co-morbid depression demonstrate impaired response
inhibition or thought suppression? The inhibitory
dysfunction endophenotype would predict impaired
response inhibition in OCD regardless of co-morbid
depression.
Method
Participants
The study was approved by the local research ethics
committee and all participants provided written, in-
formed consent before testing. OCD patients (n=40),
20 with depression and 20 without depression, were
recruited from a specialist OCD out-patient centre
after being diagnosed and screened by a certiﬁed
consultant psychiatrist (N.A.F.) using DSM-IV criteria
(APA, 1994) and an extended clinical interview sup-
plemented by the Mini-International Neuropsychiatric
Inventory (Sheehan et al. 1998). Though co-morbid
anxiety and depression symptoms were not excluded
provided OCD was the principal diagnosis, we
excluded patients with other DSM-IV Axis-I co-
morbidities, history of head injury or other neuro-
logical, neurodevelopmental or medically relevant
disorders. OCD and depression severity were as-
sessed with the Yale–Brown Obsessive Compulsive
Scale (YBOCS; Goodman et al. 1989) and the
Montgomery–Asberg Depression Rating Scale
(MADRS; Montgomery & Asberg, 1979), respectively.
There was a maximal MADRS cut-oﬀ of 10 for non-
depressed patients and a minimal cut-oﬀ of 20 for de-
pressed patients. Healthy controls (n=20), recruited
via advertisements, scored 10 or below on the
MADRS, and were screened for the exclusion criteria
of psychiatric illness, history of head injury or neuro-
logical disorder and psychotropic medication. In the
non-depressed OCD group, 19 patients were receiving
SSRIs, of which ten were also receiving a low dose of
an atypical neuroleptic, and one was medication free.
In the depressed OCD group, 19 patients were receiv-
ing SSRIs of which one was also receiving a low dose
of an atypical neuroleptic and one patient was medi-
cation free. Group characteristics and scores on the
National Adult Reading Test (Nelson, 1982) assessing
verbal intelligence, the Padua Inventory (Burns et al.
1996) characterizing self-reported compulsivity and
obsessionality and the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory
(STAI; Spielberger et al. 1983) assessing anxiety are
reported in Table 1.
Table 1. Demographic and clinical measures from OCD depressed, OCD non-depressed and healthy control groups
OCD depressed (n=20) OCD non-depressed (n=20) Controls (n=20)
Fp
Gender, n
Male 10 10 10
Female 10 10 10
Age, years 41.7 (13.8) 39.2 (13.7) 40.2 (14.4) 0.16 0.85
Verbal IQ 116.3 (6.4) 116.3 (7.3) 117.3 (6.0) 0.15 0.86
YBOCS 24.2 (6.1) 21.1 (8.3) 0.6 (1.1) 91.2 <0.001
MADRS 25.3 (7.6) 7.2 (5.3) 4.3 (3.1) 81.7 <0.001
STAI-S 45.3 (10.8) 38.9 (10.6) 30.8 (6.7) 11.4 <0.001
STAI-T 61.9 (10.6) 54.0 (9.5) 36.1 (7.3) 40.9 <0.001
Padua 63.7 (20.2) 40.1 (16.2) 12.4 (7.9) 54.2 <0.001
COWC 19.2 (9.2) 13.8 (9.1) 4.0 (3.6) 19.5 <0.001
DRGRC 6.4 (4.3) 3.7 (3.8) 1.0 (1.3) 12.5 <0.001
CHKC 24.9 (8.3) 14.8 (8.5) 4.8 (4.4) 37.6 <0.001
OTAHSO 10.1 (5.9) 5.2 (3.1) 1.8 (1.7) 21.9 <0.001
OITHSO 3.3 (4.5) 2.7 (2.9) 0.8 (1.0) 3.4 <0.05
OCD, Obsessive–compulsive disorder; IQ, intelligence quotient; YBOCS, Yale–Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale; MADRS,
Montgomery–Asberg Depression Rating Scale; STAI, State-Trait Anxiety Inventory; -S, state; -T, trait; COWC, contamination
obsessions and washing compulsions; DRGRC, dressing/grooming compulsions; CHKC, checking compulsions; OTAHSO,
obsessional thoughts of harm to self/others; OITHSO, obsessional impulses of harm to self/others.
Values are given as mean (standard deviation).
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The task comprised two blocks, one employing neutral
words and the other employing OCD-relevant words,
with presentation order counterbalanced within
groups. In each block, a stop phase included 60 trials
followed by a repetition phase of 80 trials (Fig. 1). On
each trial following 500 ms ﬁxation a word in white
was presented on a black screen and participants
pressed one of two response buttons determining
whether the word was a noun or not (i.e. an adjective
or verb) as fast as they could with their dominant
hand. Mapping of responses to buttons was counter-
balanced within each presentation order per group.
In the stop phase, participants were told that on
occasion a tone will signal that they stop the ongoing
task and refrain from pressing the buttons. Instead
they should press another key with their non-
dominant hand as fast as possible [switching to a
diﬀerent response, rather than simply stopping, was
hypothesized to increase inhibitory eﬀort (Logan &
Burkell, 1986)]. In the stop phase, a third of trials were
stop trials where the word was followed by a tone
(440 Hz, 400 ms in duration) and was simultaneously
replaced with a mask of random letters. The duration
between word onset and tone onset, termed stop sig-
nal delay, was adjusted online individually to short or
long (20% or 80% of median cumulative go trials
duration). On the remaining go trials, a mask replaced
the words with the corresponding short and long
durations, but no tone was presented. Previous
evidence suggests that repetition priming is sensitive
to stimulus duration but not to shifting of responses
during initial stimulus presentation (Logan, 1985). The
next trial began 3000 ms after stimulus onset, regard-
less of participant response.
In the repetition phase, no stop signals were pres-
ented and the words remained visible until response.
All stop and go-repeat trials (randomly selected half
of the go trials from the previous block equated
for mask duration) were presented again with 40
new stimuli. The task was preceded by 18 practice go
trials followed by a further 18 of which four were stop
trials, with the order within each 18 randomized.
Instructions were displayed at the onset of each phase
and the experimenter ensured that they were under-
stood. Self-terminated breaks were available between
blocks and midway through each block.
OCD-relevant stimuli were drawn from OCD
questionnaires and previous studies. Five clinicians
and OCD researchers rated 258 words, of which the
100 judged most relevant were chosen. These included
29 contamination-related words (e.g. ‘toilet’), 15
checking-related words (e.g. ‘recheck’), 14 miscel-
laneous words (e.g. ‘blasphemy’), with the remaining
words regarded as general to all OCD subtypes
(‘worry’). The 100 neutral words were equated for
word length, word frequency, and belonging to re-
stricted semantic categories. Words were selected by
two raters as likely to be perceived as neutral from the
following categories: gardening (e.g. ‘shrub’), beach
(e.g. ‘coastal’), fashion (e.g. ‘designer’) and oﬃce
Stop phase:
Press the left key if the word is a noun and
Press the right key if the word is not a noun
If you hear a tone, stop and press the space-bar instead
Go no-repeat
(1/3 of trials) 
Go repeat
(1/3 of trials) 
Stop repeat
(1/3 of trials)
Time 
+ + +
Doubts Excrement
Kucvsptwj Ygcaqr
Perfectly
Noxhjlgni
+ Tone 
Stop phase outcome measures: proportion successful stop, switch RT, go RT
Repetition phase:
Press the left key if the word is a noun and
Press the right key if the word is not a noun 
Novel go
(1/2 of trials)
Go repeat
(1/4 of trials)
Stop repeat
(1/4 of trials)
Time
+ + +
Doubts Worry Perfectly 
Repetition phase outcome measures: go RT, proportion consistent
Previously
successful
stops 
Previously
failed
stops 
(a)( b)
Fig. 1. Illustration of a typical series of trials in go no-repeat, go repeat and stop repeat conditions in the stop phase (a) and
repetition phase (b) of the thought stop-signal task. For each word the participant makes a speeded response via a key press
deciding whether the word is a noun or not. Go and stop repeat stimuli appear both in the stop and repetition phases while
no-repeat stimuli are replaced with novel stimuli in the repetition phase. Stop signal delays in stop trials were determined online
as a function of individual go reaction times (RTs). Stop repeat trials in the repetition phase were analysed based on stop
outcome in the stop phase, with words that were previously inhibited successfully compared with responses to words that had
previously failed to be successfully inhibited.
4 S. Morein-Zamir et al.domains (e.g. ‘briefcase’), to match contamination,
checking, miscellaneous and general domains, respec-
tively. The task was programmed in VISUAL BASIC.NET
(Microsoft Corp., USA) and stimulus order, condition
order and allocation of words to condition were ran-
domized for each participant. The task was adminis-
tered on an Avantech Paceblade and go responses
were performed on a custom button-box.
Task outcome measures included reaction time (RT)
in ms and response chosen (noun or not a noun).
Accuracy was not computed, as the majority of stimuli
could be both nouns and adjectives/verbs. The data
from the stop and repetition phases were analysed
separately. Go trials with RTs faster than 400 ms and
slower than 3000 ms consisted of 2.5% of all go trials
and were omitted from the analyses (at the individual
level a mean of 2.5% of trials was omitted, S.D.=3.2).
Logarithmic mean go RTs and arcsine-transformed
proportional data were analysed using analyses of
variance (ANOVA) with simple main eﬀects and
Tukey’s honest signiﬁcant diﬀerence (HSD) for pair-
wise comparisons with an a level of 0.05 where
appropriate. Data are presented as untransformed
means. Pearson correlation coeﬃcients were used for
correlation analyses.
Results
Clinical and psychological rating scales
The three groups did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly with re-
spect to age, gender or verbal intelligence quotient (see
Table 1). Tukey’s HSD comparisons revealed that the
two OCD groups did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly in YBOCS
overall or subscale scores (p>0.2) and the non-
depressed OCD group did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from
controls on the MADRS score (p>0.24). For the STAI
and Padua measures all comparisons between groups
were signiﬁcant, with the exception of the STAI-state
scores between the two OCD groups. The Padua sub-
scales indicated that all depressed OCD patients had
prominent checking compulsions and all but one had
contamination obsessions and compulsions. All but
one of the non-depressed OCD patients had promi-
nent checking compulsions and all but two had con-
tamination obsessions and compulsions. Omitting
these patients did not alter the results reported below.
Analysis of stop phase
Go RT responses to the words were analysed with
group (OCD depressed, OCD non-depressed and con-
trols) and stimulus type (OCD-relevant versus neutral)
as factors. Latencies for button presses to OCD-
relevant stimuli (1015 ms) were longer than for neutral
stimuli (957 ms). The ANOVA revealed a signiﬁcant
eﬀect for stimulus type [F(1,57)=6.3, p<0.05], with
all other eﬀects failing to reach signiﬁcance (p>0.32
for all).
Inhibition performance was examined by analysing
the proportion of successfully inhibited trials with
group as a between-subjects factor and stimuli type
and delay (short versus long) as repeated measures.
The proportion of successfully inhibited trials for the
OCD depressed (0.48) and non-depressed groups
(0.50) did not signiﬁcantly diﬀer (p=0.97) but were
both signiﬁcantly worse than for the control group
(0.75) (Cohen’s d=0.76) (see Fig. 2). As anticipated, the
inhibition proportion was higher for short delays
(0.84) than for long delays (0.29). Correspondingly, an
ANOVA revealed a signiﬁcant eﬀect for group
[F(2,57)=6.4, p<0.01], delay [F(1,57)=244, p<0.01],
and for the interaction between stimulus type and
delay [F(2,57)=7.5, p<0.05]. The remaining eﬀects
were not signiﬁcant (p>0.34 for all). The interaction
between stimulus type and delay stemmed from a
crossover with OCD stimuli leading to lower inhi-
bition than neutral stimuli in the short delay (0.83 v.
0.85, respectively), but higher inhibition in the long
delay (0.32 v. 0.26, respectively). No simple main eﬀect
reached signiﬁcance.
Switch performance following a stop signal was
examined by analysing RTs to press the space-bar
following successful stops (see Fig. 3). A 3r2 ANOVA
with group and stimulus type revealed a main eﬀect
for stimulus type [F(1,57)=9.3, p<0.01] and inter-
action between group and stimulus type [F(2,57)=4.2,
p<0.05] with no eﬀect for group (p>0.5). Simple main
eﬀects indicated that there was a signiﬁcant stimulus
type eﬀect [F(1,57)=16.0, p<0.01] that did not diﬀer
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Fig. 2. Percentage successful inhibition to the stop signal
following obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD)-relevant ( )
and neutral (%) stimuli in OCD patients with co-morbid
depression (OCD+dep), OCD patients without co-morbid
depression (OCDxdep) and a control group. Values are
means, with standard errors represented by vertical bars.
The ﬁgure demonstrates impaired inhibition in the OCD
groups regardless of stimulus type.
Inhibition of thoughts and actions in OCD 5between the two OCD groups (p>0.4), but no stimu-
lus type eﬀect for the control group (p>0.45).
Thus, results revealed impaired motor response
inhibition in OCD and an eﬀect for stimulus type on
switching that was exclusive to OCD patients. At the
same time all participants showed similar go RT
slowing to OCD-relevant stimuli.
Analysis of repetition phase
Mean go RTs in the repetition block were subjected to
an ANOVA with group as a between-subjects factor
and stimulus type and repetition condition (repeat go,
repeat stop and novel stimuli) as within-subjects fac-
tors. As in the stop block, RTs to OCD-relevant stimuli
(1022 ms) were signiﬁcantly slower than to neutral
stimuli (968 ms) [F(1,57)=17.6, p<0.01]. In addition,
there was a repetition priming eﬀect [F(2,57)=14.8,
p<0.01], with RTs to repeat go stimuli (975 ms) and
RTs to repeat stop stimuli (982 ms) being signiﬁcantly
faster than to novel stimuli (1026 ms, p<0.05). RTs to
repeat go and repeat stop did not signiﬁcantly diﬀer
(p>0.5). To test thought suppression, RTs to repeat
stop trials were entered into an additional ANOVA
with group as a between-subjects factor and stimulus
type and stop outcome as within-subjects factors.
Stop outcome refers to whether the stop response to
the stimulus in the stop block failed or was successful.
RTs to stimuli of successful stops were signiﬁcantly
longer (1015 ms) than those of failed stops (924 ms)
[F(1,55)=25.3, p<0.01]. All other eﬀects with the ex-
ception of stimulus type were non-signiﬁcant (all
p>0.35).
Although absolute accuracy could not be analysed,
consistency across presentations was examined.
Proportion consistent refers to the proportion of stim-
uli to which participants responded with the same
judgement in both the stop and repetition phases. An
ANOVA on proportion consistent including group
and stimulus type revealed a main eﬀect of group
[F(2,57)=4.2, p<0.05], with all other eﬀects being non-
signiﬁcant (p>0.15 for all eﬀects). Proportion consist-
ent for the OCD depressed (0.80) and non-depressed
groups (0.81) did not signiﬁcantly diﬀer (p>0.5) but
was worse for both OCD groups than for controls
(0.88, Cohen’s d=0.81). The comparisons between
OCD depressed and controls and OCD non-depressed
and controls were both signiﬁcant (p<0.02).
Thus, these results indicate intact thought sup-
pression as measured by repetition priming in OCD
patients, though less consistent responses.
Correlation analyses
Correlations between MADRS, YBOCS, STAI-trait and
Padua scores were all signiﬁcant within the combined
sample of OCD patients (Pearson’s r values ranging
from 0.39 to 0.61, p<0.05). Correlations between TSST-
related measures and symptom severity measures
demonstrated a signiﬁcant correlation between the
slowing to OCD compared with neutral stimuli in the
repetition phase, and MADRS scores [r=0.38, t(38)=
2.5, p<0.05]. When examining the Padua subscales
there were signiﬁcant negative correlations between
stopping performance to neutral words and the con-
tamination obsessions and washing compulsions scale
[r=x0.33, t(38)=2.0, p<0.05], and stopping per-
formance to concern words and obsessional impulses
to harm self or other [r=x0.33, t(38)=2.2, p<0.05].
There were no signiﬁcant correlations between stop
and switch performances.
Discussion
This study tested whether OCD patients with or
without depression diﬀered from controls in a novel
adaptation of the TSST paradigm. The task required
participants to decide whether words were nouns or
not and on occasion a tone signalled that they were to
inhibit their response and instead switch to a diﬀerent
one. Repetition priming on a subsequent presentation
gauged thought suppression. OCD patients demon-
strated impaired motor inhibition compared with
controls for all stimulus types, and impaired switching
from OCD-relevant but not neutral words. Stimulus
meaning did not diﬀerentially inﬂuence patient stop
or go performances per se, nor did it aﬀect the sub-
sequent processing of the words as measured by rep-
etition priming. These results indicate that emotional
relevance of the stimulus interacts diﬀerentially with
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Fig. 3. Reaction time (RT) performance to pressing the space
bar following a stop signal following obsessive-compulsive
disorder (OCD)-relevant ( ) and neutral (%) stimuli in OCD
patients with co-morbid depression (OCD+dep), OCD
patients without co-morbid depression (OCDxdep) and a
control group. Values are means, with standard errors
represented by vertical bars. The ﬁgure demonstrates
slowed switching in the OCD groups which is speciﬁc to
OCD-relevant stimuli.
6 S. Morein-Zamir et al.the various executive components in the TSST para-
digm, i.e. inhibition and switching, in OCD patients.
The ﬁndings also reinforce the potential usefulness of
response inhibition dysfunction across diﬀerent con-
texts as an endophenotype for OCD (Chamberlain
et al. 2005), especially as the deﬁcits in OCD were
found regardless of depression status. Inhibition per-
formance within the patients also correlated with
particular subscales of the Padua Inventory, suggest-
ing that patients who experience contamination ob-
sessions or impulses to harm themselves or others
may be especially impaired. The results extend pre-
vious stop-signal ﬁndings in OCD, as impaired stop-
ping was found with considerably more demanding
go judgements than previous stop signal tasks which
used simple spatial discriminations, and which did
not require response switching.
All groups were slower to respond (go RT) to the
OCD-relevant words, with no diﬀerential slowing in
the OCD groups. Prior work has shown that medi-
cated OCD patients do not show abnormal RT bias to
generally aﬀective stimuli (Chamberlain et al. 2007a),
though there may be abnormal neural processing
(Menzies et al. 2008). Whereas stimulus meaning had
no diﬀerential eﬀect on response generation and inhi-
bition, it did have a clear eﬀect on the speed of an
alternate, switching response. Impaired switching in
the TSST may be attributed to dysfunction in several
potential mechanisms, including disengaging from
the go stimulus, shifting, or responding to the tone
(Posner & Petersen, 1990). The lack of signiﬁcant dif-
ferences between the groups’ performance in the rep-
etition phase suggests that impaired switching in
OCD was primarily due to shifting or re-engaging
with a diﬀerent stimulus. This is consistent with evi-
dence that OCD patients have diﬃculties in atten-
tional set-shifting and exhibit cognitive inﬂexibility
(Chamberlain et al. 2006a). Moreover, the current re-
sults indicate that stimulus meaning may worsen such
impairments. Stimulus salience or relevance may play
a role in accounting for inconsistencies in the OCD
literature as in the case of the Wisconsin Card Sorting
Test (Kuelz et al. 2004) and directed forgetting (see
below). Future studies may further explore the role of
stimulus relevance in cognitive shifting, switching and
ﬂexibility in OCD. OCD patients were also less con-
sistent when judging the same stimulus again, i.e. they
were less likely than controls to choose the same re-
sponse on repetition trials. This may reﬂect worse
memory, though we believe it is more likely to be at-
tributable to general indecision, or impaired stimulus-
response learning as often found in OCD patients
(Muller & Roberts, 2005).
As predicted, there was a diﬀerence in the repetition
phase between previously successfully stopped and
previously failed stop words, conﬁrming the existence
of thought suppression. Thus, repetition priming was
indeed sensitive to the fate of the mental processing
accompanying the word judgement, suggesting that
when a judgement was successfully inhibited, the
accompanying thought was abandoned. These eﬀects
occurred equally in all groups, supporting intact
unintentional thought suppression in OCD in the
repetition phase, and limiting the ‘inhibition endo-
phenotype’ for OCD to volitional motor responses.
Thus, the OCD groups were not impaired in disenga-
ging from the word stimulus although they were im-
paired at switching from OCD-relevant words in the
initial phase. This suggests that they did not ruminate
unnecessarily or carry out the judgement implicitly
whilst complying overtly with task instructions. That
individuals with OCD appear to terminate their on-
going processing eﬀectively when given a salient ex-
ternal signal to switch may be useful for various forms
of behavioural therapy. For example, rather than
identifying and monitoring their current obsessions
internally, severe OCD patients may initially be ex-
ternally cued on occasion to facilitate their refocusing
away from ongoing obsessions.
The lack of eﬀect of co-morbid depression on
TSST performance measures is consistent with the re-
sponse inhibition endophenotype hypothesis. Namely,
inhibitory deﬁcits were not exacerbated by the indi-
vidual’s current aﬀective state. Although the OCD
groups were matched for symptom severity in clin-
ician-rated YBOCS scores, depressed OCD patients
scored higher in all self-report measures including
anxiety, obsessions and compulsions. This dissoci-
ation between self-report and TSST performance fur-
ther illustrates the importance of stable, objective and
replicable markers of dysfunction in OCD. Moreover,
the results strengthen the notion that depression
within the context of OCD diﬀers from depression
without OCD, as no abnormal processing of aﬀective
stimuli was noted. While the present study cannot
generalize to individuals with MDD and no OCD, it is
generally not incompatible with evidence that such
individuals have preserved response inhibition (Lau
et al. 2007). Preserved response inhibition in MDD
could be important as it stands in contrast to the broad
impairments in executive function typically found
(Chamberlain & Sahakian, 2004).
Impairmentsininhibitionhavebeenreportedinsev-
eral additional psychiatric disorders to date, including
attention deﬁcit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and
schizophrenia (Badcock et al. 2002; Lijﬃjt et al. 2005)
and thus are not speciﬁc to OCD. Nevertheless, re-
sponse inhibition deﬁcits in OCD appear integral to
aspects of the symptoms and psychology of OCD
(Chamberlain et al. 2005). Moreover, the exact nature
Inhibition of thoughts and actions in OCD 7of the inhibitory deﬁcits and the developmental tra-
jectory associated with each disorder appear diﬀerent.
In the case of ADHD, impaired response inhibition
seems more pronounced in adult ADHD (Lijﬃjt et al.
2005). The exact pattern of impaired inhibition across
the life span in OCD is as yet undetermined, but the
endophenotype hypothesis makes clear predictions
about its presence before symptom onset. By using
more reﬁned tests of inhibition, a better characteriz-
ation of inhibitory impairments in each disorder may
be aﬀorded. Stimulus meaning may be used to further
probeinhibitoryperformanceacrossvariousdisorders.
One limitation of the present study is that almost all
patients were stabilized on SSRI medication at testing,
which could have led to diminished emotional re-
sponses to OCD-relevant words (Harmer et al. 2004).
Accordingly, medication status and responsiveness
may underlie inconsistent results as with aﬀective
Stroop in OCD (Kuelz et al. 2004). Future studies could
explore medication inﬂuences on emotional proces-
sing in OCD by studying unaﬀected ﬁrst-degree re-
latives. SSRI medication in the OCD groups did not,
however, mask the response inhibition deﬁcit, in
keeping with ﬁndings that serotonergic manipulations
do not inﬂuence stop-signal performance (Clark et al.
2005; Chamberlain et al. 2006b). Another limitation is
the inclusion of OCD-relevant stimuli with diﬀerent
valences and encompassing various obsessionality
and compulsivity domains. Prior work has yielded
conﬂicting results as to whether OCD patients show
impairments to primarily OCD-relevant stimuli re-
gardless of valence, or primarily to negative valence
regardless of OCD-relevance (Tolin et al. 2002; Bohne
et al. 2005). Whilst the OCD-relevant stimuli were
mostly negative, owing to the large number of stimuli
required, we included words with potentially positive
valence such as ‘health’ and ‘certain’. We believe that
all words in the OCD-relevant block would be inter-
preted within the general context of negative OCD-
relevant stimuli. Likewise, for each participant the
majority of words would be relevant to their particular
concerns, as over half the stimuli were selected as rel-
evant to all OCD domains. Accordingly, all partici-
pants identiﬁed the OCD-relevant block as more
negative.
In conclusion, the results support inhibition deﬁcits
that are not inﬂuenced by stimulus meaning in OCD
patients with or without co-morbid depression. For all
groups, word processing stopped with action termin-
ation, regardless of word meaning. The study has
indicated that the endophenotype of response inhi-
bition in OCD (Menzies et al. 2007) can be extended to
patients with co-morbid depression and to meaningful
stimuli, though not to unintentional thought sup-
pression.
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